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TULSA LAW, JOURNAL
employee's taxable income, why should a non-reimbursed part
of the same kind of expense be measured by a different scale?
As was pointed out in the dissent, the conclusion of the ma-jority in Mendel flies in the face of the Service's pronouncements,
and disregards the subsequent cases based thereon 12 which hold
such expenditures not to be allowable as deductions. Revenue Rul-
ing 54-429 sets out three distinct provisions relating to moving ex-
penses: (1) reimbursements are not taxable to an employee if
the entire amount of the reimbursement is expended for moving;(2) any excess of the reimbursement over the actual moving cost
is taxable to the employee; and (3) any expense incurred byv the
employee in excess of the reimbursement is personal, and thus
not deductible by the employee.13
Were it not for the third provision of that ruling, the Mendel
case might be seen as a logical extension of the first. In reaching
its conclusion, however, the court apparently chose to disregard the
third provision, which specifically disallowed deduction of moving
expenses incurred by the employee in excess of an allowance or
reimbursement by his employer.
In support of the Mendel case, it should be said that the
court probably took a more realistic view than did the Commis-
sioner in promulgating -his ruling. The effect of the ruling would
be to accept the employer's estimate in making an allowance or
reimbursement as a conclusive statement of the cost of moving
the employee's family and personal effects. To strictly adhere
to the ruling would be to disregard the ordinary and necessary
cost of moving in individual cases as a basis for distinguishing
business expenses from personial expenses incurred by the em-
ployee.
John B. Jarboe
TAx: RESTRAMING TBE ASSESSMENT OR COLLECTION OF
TAXES: SECTION 7421 (a) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUrE CODE
The prompt payment of taxes is important to any govern-
ment. Taxpayers invariably resist the collection of taxes, therefore
"all governments, in all times, have found it necessary to adopt
stringent measures for the collection of taxes, and to be rigid in
the enforcement of them."'
Under the authority granted by Article I, section 8 of the
Constitution 2 Congress can prescribe the conditions under which
12 H. Willis Nichols, Jr., 13 T.C. 916 (1949), and United States v.
Woodall, 255 F.2d 370 (10th Cir. 1958).
13 Rev. Rul. 54-429, 1954-2 Cum. BuLL. 53.
1 Cheatham v. United States, 92 U.S. 85, 87, 23 L.Ed. 561, 562 (1876).2 This section provides, in part, that "Congress shall have Power To lay
and collect Taxes, ... " and 'To make all Laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers ... "1
['Vol. 1, No. I
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courts may interfere with the collection of taxes. Section 7421
(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 states: 'Except as pro-
vided in sections 6212(a) and (c), and 6213(a), no suit for
the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax
shall be maintained in any court." This statute was first enacted,
in essentially the same form, in 1867.
Although the courts acknowledged that the assessment and
collection of taxes must be accomplished without judicial inter-
ference,4 equity jurisdicion of the courts has been invoked if (1)
the taxpayer had no adequate remedy by ordinary process of law,
or the enforcement of the tax would (2) result in a multiplicity
of suits, (3) produce irreparable injury, or (4) the assessment or
attempted collection would throw a cloud upon the taxpayer's title
to property.5 However the general rule has been that a taxpayer
must pay his taxes and sue for a refund before he could seekjudicial intervention.
The wording of section 7421(a) is clear and unambiguous.
Nevertheless it has been held to be inapplicable under certain
conditions. A suit to restrain collection can be maintained if the
court determines that the government has not complied with all
statutory procedural requirements. An example is the recent case
of Dierks v. United States.6 Counsel for Mr. Dierks entered into
a written stipulation with the Internal Revenue Service, admitting
a tax and penalty liability of $247,996.19. This stipulation also
provided a waiver to all restrictions regarding assessment and
collection of the tax deficiency. At the time this agreement was
made Mr. Dierks was in a coma. Shortly thereafter he died. It
was contended that this stipulation was invalid, therefore an
injunction was sought to restrain the government from asserting
a lien against his estate until the validity of this document could
be determined. Under the provisions of section 6213(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code collection activities are restrained until
a decision of the tax court has become final.7 Since the tax
court's decision would not be final until the validity of the stipu-
lation had been ascertained, the district court granted a pre-
liminary injunction.
Despite the plain wording of the prohibitory statute, courts
have intervened if it was determined that a taxpayer's case came
within one of the judicially defined exceptions. These exceptions
are (1) the penalty exception, (2) the nontaxpayer exception, and
(3) the extraordinary and exceptional circumstances exception.
3 Revenue Act of 1867, ch. 169, § 10, 14 Stat. 475.
4 Cheatham v. United States, 92 U.S. 85, 23 L.Ed. 561 (1876).
G Dows v. Chicago, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 108, 20 L.Ed. 65 (1871).6215 F.Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
7 The Code Provides: "Except as otherwise provided in sec. 6861 [jeopardy
assessments] no assessment of a deficiency in respect of any tax . .. shall
be made, begun, or prosecuted.., until the decision of the Tax Court has
become final.
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This latter category was, for practical purposes, eliminated as an
exception by the Supreme Court in Enochs v. Williams Packing &
Nay. Co.8
The Penalty Exception
Section 7421(a) and its predecessors specifically relate to
a tax. Consequently if the court determines that the tax is a crim-
inal penalty, then a suit to restrain the attempted assessment or
collection can be maintained.
The complainant in Lipke v. Lederere contended that the tax
assessed against him was not a tax, but was punishment for viola-
tion of the National Prohibition Act. The Supreme Court agreed
and reversed the district court's decree denying an injunction.
Irrespective of the label placed on a tax the Court declared the
primary function or purpose of the tax controlled in determining
whether it was a criminal penalty. A distinction was drawn be-
tween the functions of a tax (to provide support for the govern-
ment) and a penalty (punishment for infringement of the law).
Since there could be no assessment until there bad been a viola-
tion of the National Prohibition Act, the 'tax' was classified as a
criminal penalty. Therefore it was not within the scope of the
prohibitory statute, and the assessment could be restrained.
Another case, Regal Drug Corp. v. Wardell, ° also involving
the imposition of a tax for violation of the National Prohibition
Act was decided by the Supreme Court later in the same year
(1922) as its decision in the Lipke case. In reversing the district
court's order denying injunctive relief the Court affirmed the
Lipke decision.
A distinction has been drawn between a tax which is in effect
a criminal penalty, and a tax which is an administrative penalty.
If the court determines that the penalties are an integral part of
the tax statute, then they are said to be "administrative pen-
alties and are within the impeding statute just as much as
primary taxes."" Accordingly the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
in the recent case of Botta v. Scanlon12 declared that a penalty
imposed equal to the amount of the tax not paid was merely
a method to ensure payment of the tax, and not a criminal penalty.
Although penalties imposed for failure to file a return or for
fraudulent underpayment are in excess of the tax due, they are
not classified as criminal penalties.'3
8370 U.S. 1, 82 Sup.Ct. 1125, 8 L.Ed.2d 292 (1962).
9259 U.S. 557, 42 Sup.Ct. 549, 66 L.Ed. 1061 (1922).
10260 U.S. 386, 43 Sup.Ct. 152, 67 L.Ed. 318 (1922).
11Reams v. Vrooman-Fehn Printing Co., 140 F.2d 237, 241 (6th Cir.
1944).
12314 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1963).
13 The Supreme Court in Helvering v. Mitchell, 203 U.S. 391, 402, 58
Sup.Ct. 630, 634, 82 L.Ed. 917, 923-924 (1938), in discussing the penalty
for fraudulent underpayment, declared: "That Congress provided a distinctly
[Vol. 1, No. I
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The Nontaxpayer Exception
Since the revenue laws are a system to regulate tax assessment
and collection, they relate to taxpayers, and not to nontaxpayers.
The Internal Revenue Code provides a method whereby a tax-
payer may maintain an action after taxes have been paid and
refund has been denied by the Commissioner.14 No procedure
is prescribed for nontaxpayers. If the Collector levies upon prop-
erty of a nontaxpayer to collect a tax owed by the taxpayer, the
nontaxpayer is not within the scope of the prohibitory statute
and collection activities can be restrained. 15
In Helvey v. Wiseman'6 the petitioner's name had been forged
on a joint tax return by her ex-husband. After being reassured by
her ex-husband's attorney that she would not become involved in
a tax dispute between the Collector and her ex-husband, she signed
a tax petition. Subsequently she received no notice of the hearing
nor of the assessment against her property. When a lien was
asserted against this property she sought injunctive relief based
on these facts, and also on the fact that if these taxes were paid
there would be "no remedy whereby she could sue to recover
the taxes . . . ."17 The district court expressed the opinion that
the Internal Revenue Service could not create or assess income
taxes against someone who did not have any income. Notwith-
standing the prohibition of section 7421(a), a permanent injunc-
tion was granted.
The Collector, in Rothensies v. Ullman,'8 attempted to levy
upon the joint bank account of a husband and wife to collect
taxes owed by the husband. The bank refused to honor this levy
because under the laws of the state of Pennsylvania estates of
tenants by entireties could not be attached or levied upon for an
obligation due by either spouse individually. After the district
court quashed the warrant of distraint the government failed to
obtain a supersedeas within the required 10 day period. The
husband and wife withdrew the entire balance from their account
in the interim between the district court's decree sustaining the
bank's action and the appeal by the government. The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals held there was no subject matter upon which
the judgment of the court could operate, therefore the district
court's order was sustained. The court, however, stated this did
civil procedure for the collection of the additional 50 per centum indicates
clearly that it intended a civil, not a criminal sanction." See also: Harvey v.
Early, 160 F.2d 836, 837 (4th Cir. 1947); Burke v. Mingori, 128 F.2d 996(10th Cir. 1942).
14 INT. v. CODE Or 1954, § 7422.
15 Long v. Rasmussen, 281 Fed. 236 (D.C.Mont. 1922).
16 199 F.Supp. 200 (W.D.Okla. 1961).
17 Id. at 205.
18110 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1940).
19641
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not preclude the Collector from distraining upon any other prop-
erty of the taxpayer for payment of the tax.
The Collector of Internal Revenue is authorized to levy "upon
all property and rights to property"1 and homesteads are not
specifically exempt.20 In Bigley v. Jones2' the district court held
that the law of the state must be considered in determining wheth-
er the property sought to be seized is the property of the taxpayer
or his wife. Under Oklahoma law the wife has an indivisible and
vested interest in homestead property, therefore the property is not
subject to levy and sale for the satisfaction of a tax liability of
the husband.22
Injunctive relief was granted in New York Cas. Co. v. Zwer-
net23 to restrain the Collector from attaching the balance due a
contractor on a construction project. There were three claims
against this fund: (1) unpaid claims for labor and material against
the contractor, (2) reimbursement due the bonding company for
payments it had made, and (3) the claims of the Internal Revenue
Service for taxes owed by the contractor. Since the total amount
of these claims was greater than the amount due the contractor,
the Casualty Company sought to restrain the government's col-
lection activities until it had been paid. The court granted in-junctive relief, stating that the Casualty Company had a prior
equitable lien upon the fund which was superior to the govern-
ment's tax lien.
A contractor in the recent case of Logan Planing Mill Co. v.
Fidelity & Gas. Co.,24 had difficulty in securing a contractor's bond.
To assist him, Logan Mill agreed to indemnify the surety company.
An agreement was reached whereby funds due the contractor on a
construction contract would be paid directly to a Mr. Lassiter as
trustee for Logan Mill and the surety company. After the govern-
ment sought to collect taxes due from the contractor by attaching
a lien against this fund, Logan Mill brought a quiet title action.
The district court held that Logan Mill was entitled to this money
because of the rights they had acquired by subrogation. Moreover,
the contractor was determined not to be the owner of this fund at
the time the tax was assessed. The court recognized that the pur-
pose of section 7421 is to prevent suits by taxpayers to contest
liability and to bar collection, but "the prohibitions of section 7421
have no applicability to suits to protect property of a nontaxpayer
which the government has seized to satisfy a taxpayer's liability."25
19 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6331(a).
20 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6334.
2164 F.Supp. 389 (W.D.Okla. 1946).22 However property of tenants by entireties, which is not a homestead,
may be subject to a lien to collect taxes owed by the husband. See Pilip v.
United States, 186 F.Supp. 397 (D.Alaska 1960).
23 58 F.Supp. 473 (N.D.Ill. 1944).
24212 F.Supp. 906 (S.D.W.Va. 1962).
25 Id. at 912.
[Vol. 1, No. 1
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The Extraordinary and Exceptional Circumstances Exception
Section 7421(a), if literally construed, would bar all suits re-
straining the assessment or collection of taxes. In addition to the
penalty and nontaxpayer exceptions, the extraordinary and excep-
tional circumstances exception has evolved as a third basis for
circumventing the statute. Development of this latter exception
was in four phases: (1) when the Court merely indicated that such
circumstances might be sufficient to render the prohibitory statute
inapplicable,26 (2) a case in which extraordinary and exceptional
circumstances were found to exist,27 (3) followed by a decision
in which this exception reached its zenith.28 The cycle was com-
pleted (4) by a decision which virtually eliminated extraordinary
and exceptional circumstances as an exception to section 7421(a).29
The Supreme Court in Dodge v. Osborn8" stated that the al-
leged unconstitutionality of a tax was insufficient to overcome the
statutory prohibition against suits to restrain assessment or collec-
tion of taxes but indicated that "extraordinary and entirely excep-
tional" circumstances might be sufficient.
Extraordinary and exceptional circumstances were found to
exist in the Hill v. W9allace3l case. Members of the Chicago Board
of Trade sought to prevent the Board from being designated as
a 'contract market.' Without this designation, every transaction of
the Board would be subject to a heavy tax and a criminal penalty
would be levied for every sale on which the tax had not been paid.
In delivering the opinion of the Court Chief justice Taft declared
that payment of the tax by the 1600 members of the Board, with
suits to recover the tax would "necessitate a multiplicity of suits,
and, indeed, would be impracticable."32 He concluded that "these
exceptional and extraordinary circumstances ... make section
3224 [now section 74211 inapplicable."33
The taxpayer in Graham v. DuPont34 failed to convince the
Court that his situation was so extraordinary and exceptional as
to circumvent the prohibitory statute. Taxpayer alleged that he
had no remedy at law because a suit to recover the tax would be
barred by a statute of limitation. In denying relief the Court stated
that a taxpayer could not delay making his payment until his right
to sue to recover had expired, and then claim that this was an extra-
2( Dodge v. Osborn. 240 U.S. 118, 36 Sup.Ct. 275, 60 L.Ed. 557 (1916).
27 Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 42 Sup.Ct. 453, 66 L.Ed. 822 (1922).2 8 Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 52 Sup.Ct. 260,
76 L.Ed. 422 (1932).29 Enochs v. Williams Packing & Nay. Co., 370 U.S. 1, 82 Sup.Ct. 1125,
8 L.Ed.2d 292 (1962).
30 240 U.S. 118, 36 Sup.Ct. 275, 60 L.Ed. 557 (1916).
31259 U.S. 44, 42 Sup.Ct. 453, 66 L.Ed. 822 (1922).
32 Id. at 62, 42 Sup.Ct. at 456, 66 L.Ed. at 828.
83 Ibid.
34262 U.S. 234, 43 Sup.Ct. 567, 67 L.Ed. 965 (1923).
19641
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ordinary and entirely exceptional circumstance as to invoke the
equity jurisdiction of the Court.
In Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co.85 a dispute had arisen
between the government and Standard as to whether a product was
subject to an oleomargarine tax. Standard relied upon a letter from
the government stating that his product was not taxable as oleo-
margarine, upon a treasury ruling to the same effect, and upon a
court decision allowing another manufacturer to recover taxes paid
upon a similar product.36 Standards petition for an injunction to
restrain collection by the Revenue Service was sustained by the
Supreme Court on the basis that by no legal possibility could a
valid tax have been assessed against Standard and that "the en-
forcement of the [tax] . . . against EStandard] . ..would be arbi-
trary and oppressive, would destroy its business, ruin it financially
and inflict loss for which it would have no remedy at law," t7 there-
fore, "the reasons underlying section 3224 Enow section 74211 apply,
if at all with little force."38 These factors were held to constitute
such extraordinary and exceptional circumstances as to warrant the
Court's intervention. Justice Butler, who delivered the opinion of
the Court, stated that injunctive relief would not be granted merely
because a tax was illegal. If, however, in addition to illegality of
the tax, extraordinary and exceptional circumstances were present,
then the statute would be inapplicable. Justice Stone did not con-
cur with the majority view that equitable circumstances were suf-
ficient to remove the bar of the prohibitory statute. He declared
that this statute should preclude all relief, "whatever the equities
alleged.'u 9
Subsequent decisions of lower courts interpreting the Miller
case are not in harmony. Courts which liberally interpreted the
extraordinary and exceptional circumstances rule granted injunc-
tions.40 Illegality was interpreted in terms of whether the tax would
be of no effect to a particular taxpayer and not illegal in the sense
that the tax was absolutely void.4
1
Taxpayers had difficulty in securing judicial intervention in
courts which strictly construed the Miller decision. For instance,
the court in Reams v. Vrooman-Fehn Printing Co.42 said "hardship
in raising money with which to pay taxes is now common to all tax-
85284 U.S. 498, 52 Sup.Ct. 260, 76 L.Ed. 422 (1932).
36 Id. at 505, 52 Sup.Ct. at 261, 76 L.Ed. at 427.
37 Id. at 510-511, 52 Sup.Ct. at 263-264, 76 L.Ed. at 430.
38 Id. at 510, 52 Sup.Ct at 263, 76 LEd. at 430.
39 Id. at 511, 52 Sup.Ct. at 264, 76 L.Ed. at 430-431.
40 E.g., Midwest Haulers v. Brady, 128 F.2d 496 (6th Cir. 1942); Yoshi-
mura v. Alsup, 167 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1947); John M. Hirst & Co. v. Gentsch,
133 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1943).
-
41 Midwest Haulers v. Brady, .supra note 40, at 498.
42 140 F.2d 237 (6th Cir. 1944). A strict or liberal interpretatIoA of the
Miller decision has been applied by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, de-
pending upon the factual situation of each individual case.
W~ol. 1, No. I
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payers, but this is not a special circumstance conferring equity
jurisdiction . . . to prevent collection by injunctive process." 43 In
another case 44 the fact that the taxpayer was the sole support of his
wife, three small children, and his wife's mother, and owned no
personalty of value, was not such exceptional circumstance as
would warrant judicial intervention. Nor would the fact that the
taxpayer might be forced to discontinue publication be sufficient
to render section 7421(a) inapplicable.4 5
In 1962 the Supreme Court, in Enochs v. Williams Packing &
Nay. Co.,46 removed any doubt as to the interpretation of section
7421(a). Taxpayer sought to restrain the collection of social se-
curity and unemployment taxes for the years 1953, 1954, and 1955.
He contended that he was not liable for these taxes as the persons
who operated his fishing boats were not employees as claimed by
the government. A permanent injunction was granted taxpayer by
the the district court,4 7 which was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals.48 The lower court's decisions were reversed, and
the injunction was dissolved by the Supreme Court.49 In rendering
its opinion the Miller decision was not overruled; however, Chief
Justice Warren applied a strict interpretation to section 7241(a),
dispelling any notion that the broad equity principles enunciated
in the Miller decision would be sufficient to overcome the express
language of the statute. After stating that "the object of section 7421
(a) is to withdraw jurisdiction from the state and federal courts
to entertain suits seeking injunctions prohibiting the collection of
federal taxes," ° he declared that if Congress had intended to grant
injunctive relief from taxes lawfully due merely because there was
an inadquacy of legal remedy, they would have said so in explicit
language. Only after it has been determined that section 7421(a)
is inapplicable will the question of adequacy of legal remedy be
pertinent. Noting that the primary object of this statute was for
the purpose of permitting the collection of taxes without judicial
intervention, Chief Justice Warren restated the rule that a taxpayer
must pay, then bring suit to recover the taxes. If, however, "it is
clear that under no circumstances could the government ultimately
prevail, the central purpose of the act is inapplicable and, under
the Miller case, the attempted collection may be enjoined if equity
43 Id. at 241-242, quoting California v. Latimer, 305 U.S. 255, 262, 59
Sup.Ct. 166, 83 L.Ed. 159 (1938).44 Long v. Gray, 130 F.Supp. 194 (W.D.Ky. 1955).4 5 Publishers New Press v. Moysey, 141 F.Supp. 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1956),
citing Milliken v. Gill, 211 F.2d 869 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 348 U.S. 827,
75 Sup.Ct. 47, 99 L.Ed. 652 (1954).
40370 U.S. 1, 82 Sup.Ct 1125, 8 L.Ed.2d 292 (1962).
47 Williams Packing & Nay. Co. v. Enochs, 176 F.Supp. 168 (S.D.Miss.
1959).
48 291 F.2d 402 (5th Cir. 1961).
49370 U.S. 1, 82 Sup.Ct 1125, 8 L.Ed.2d 292 (1962).
5o Id. at 5, 82 Sup.Ct. at 1128, 8 L.Ed.2d at 295.
196437
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jurisdiction otherwise exists."51 In determining whether the govern-
ment could ultimately prevail, only the facts existing at time of suit
would be considered. All that is required is that the government
have acted in "good faith."52
The Supreme Court's decision in Enochs stressed the illegality
of the tax portion of the Miller case. Although traditional equity
principles were alluded to, they were not a factor in the Court's
decision. In Miller the Court had stated that "by no legal possibi-
lity"53 could a valid tax have been assessed against Standard. This
concept was emphasized in Enochs when Chief Justice Warren
declared that only "if it is clear that under no circumstances could
the government ultimately prevail"5 4 would section 7421(a) be in-
applicable. Only after it has been determined that the statute is
inapplicable will equity principles be considered.
Subsequent lower court decisions reflect the restrictive edicts
of the Enochs decision. Traditional equity concepts have been
minimized and the express wording of section 7421(a) has been
emphasized.
In the recent case of Reale v. Church 5 the government sought
to collect from an officer of a defunct corporation social security
and withholding taxes which the corporation had failed to pay. The
government contended that the taxpaper, as sole stockholder and
president of this corporation, had the statutory duty to "collect,
truthfully account for, and pay over these taxes."50 Taxpayer alleged
that an affiliated manufacturing company had agreed to retain
and pay these taxes. He also pleaded that he would lose his job,
and was without funds to pay-the taxes in order to comply with the
statutory requirements of paying, then suing for a refund. The dis-
trict court sympathized with the taxphyer's plight, but denied his
request for injunctive relief because "this court cannot . ..con-
clude from the facts and the law .. . that the government cannot
establish its claim."57
In Turner v. Burton 8 excise wagering deficiencies were as-
sessed against petitioner who contended that he was not in the
gambling business and therefore the assessment should be enjoined.
In conformity with the Ewchs decision the court declared that the
legality of an assessment could not be determined in an injunction
proceeding. Since "under the most liberal view of the law and the
facts" 0 the government could establish its claim, injunctive relief
was denied.
51 Id. at 7, 82 Sup.Ct. at 1129, 8 L.Ed.2d at 296.
52 Ibid.
53284 U.S. at 510, 52 Sup.Ct. at 263, 76 L.Ed. at 430.54370 U.S. at 7, 82 Sup.Ct. at 1129, 8 L.Ed.2d at 296.
55213 F.Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
56 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6672.
57 213 F.Supp. 503, 504.
58213 F.Supp. 267 (N.D.Ohio 1962).
59 Id. at 269.
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The illegality aspect of the Enochs decision was stressed in
Cohen v. Gross.60 Taxpayer had been discharged as a bankrupt in
1959, at which time the government had filed proof of claim for
income taxes for the years 1954, 1955 and 1956. Assessment, how-
ever, was not made until 1960. In denying injunctive relief the
court emphasized that "it [was] .. . simply impossible for the tax-
payer to show such clear illegality"61 as expressed in the Enochs
decision.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Botta v. Scanlon62
interpreted the Enochs decision to mean that there must be (1) no
adequate remedy at law and in addition (2) it must be apparent
from present facts that the government could not prevail before the
court would restrain collection. This court specifically acknowl-
edged the restrictive elements of the Enochs decision, declaring
that "any implication in [their prior decisions] . . . that either one
of these circumstances may alone be sufficient is overruled [by the
Enochs decisionl."
Even under the restrictive requirements of the Enochs deci-
sion, it would seem that under certain conditions the provisions of
section 7421(a) are inapplicable. If the taxpayer can prove that
the tax sought to be assessed or collected is a criminal penalty, or
that the government has not strictly complied with statutory pro-
cedural provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, or that he is not
the person who owes the tax, then equity relief may be granted.
In other factual situations it will be extremely difficult for a tax-
payer to overcome the formidable barriers delineated in the Enochs
decision since the Supreme Court has indicated that section 7421
(a) is to be literally construed.
Buford L. Allen
60 316 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1963).
61 Id. at 523.
62314 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1963).
63 Id. at 394.
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